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The second grade class had just finished reading Jack and the
Beanstalk. The teacher glanced down at her guide and then questioned the
students: "Do you think Jack is wrong to take the giant's bag of gold, then
hen and harp? Does he have a right to take these?"' In this way, the tra-
ditional story about the hen that lays golden eggs is transformed into a
discussion of morality, killing, and stealing-a discussion that many par-
ents feel has no place in the public schools.' In a number of school districts
across the country groups of parents, asserting a right to determine what
their children should be taught, are protesting the use of certain textbooks
and materials in the public school curriculum.' While it is generally undis-
puted that parents have a fundamental interest in the education of their
children,4 their attempts to wield a greater degree of control within the
school system have caused great furor in the educational community.
Illustrative of the intensity that can accompany a dispute over curric-
ulum control is the recent conflict experienced in Kanawha County, West
Virginia. This controversy arose over a recommendation by the English
textbook selection committee to the Kanawha County Board of Education
that a series of textbooks be purchased for the upcoming year.5 The nor-
mally routine procedure of adopting the committee's recommendations6
* This article is a student work prepared by Kenneth A. Schulman, a member of the ST.
JOHN'S LAW REVIEW and the St. Thomas More Institute for Legal Research.
Mathews, A Peek Into Those Criticized Textbooks, Washington Star-News, Dec. 2, 1974,
at B1, col. 1, at B4, col. 2 [hereinafter cited as Mathews].
Id. at B4.
The term "curriculum" is intended to include any course of study, book, film, activity, or
topic that comprises a part of the public school system. Protests over public school curriculum
content have recently occurred in such places as Charleston, W. Va., Prince Georges County,
Md., Boise, Idaho, St. Paul, Minn., Austin, Tex., and Baton Rouge, La. See N.Y. Times, July
25, 1975, at 47, col. 7.
' See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510, 534-35 (1925); Mott & Edelstein, Church, State, and Education-The Supreme Court
and its Critics, 2 J. LAW & ED. 535 (1973).
1 Teacher Rights Division, National Education Association, A Textbook Study in Cultural
Conflict 1-2 (D.C. Feb. 1975) [hereinafter cited as A Textbook Study]. For an excellent
discussion of the content of some of the recommended books, see Mathews, supra note 1.
' A Textbook Study, supra note 5, at 16.
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erupted into a stormy and often violent confrontation between parents and
the school board.7 Many parents denounced the recommended books as
"anti-God, anti-family, and anti-America." 8 Materials were also alleged to
invade the privacy of the children by raising personal and moral questions.,
When verbal protests and petitions were found to be ineffective," some
parents resorted to a school boycott" and, on occasion, to full-scale vio-
lence. 2
Despite compromise proposals by the school board,' 3 the violence con-
tinued and the school superintendent and three board members were ar-
rested for "contributing to the delinquency of minors by permitting use of
I School buses were struck by gunfire and schools and bridges were bombed in attempts by
some parents to enforce boycotts of classes in which the disputed books were to be used. See,
e.g., N.Y. Times, Apr. 18, 1975, at 31, col. 5; id. Apr. 15, 1975, at 21, col. 4; Associated Press,
Charleston, W. Va., Dec. 2, 1974, 17:40; United Press International, Charleston, W. Va., Nov.
14, 1974, 10:36.
United Press International, Charleston, W. Va., Nov. 15, 1974, 11:34.
A Textbook Study, supra note 5, at 29. John Mathews, a reporter who has read extensively
the Communicating series textbooks published by D.C. Heath Co., one of the more controver-
sial textbook series challenged by Kanawha County parents, has commented that,
"[plerhaps the most important departure . . . is the stress [the textbook series] puts on
the 'affective' aspect of education: a child's feelings, emotions, opinions, the ability to deal
with issues of principle." Mathews, supra note 1, at B4.
Many of the challenged materials used by Kanawha County teachers were designed to
guide class discussions on topics such as the students' personal fears and their feelings on
the morality of cheating. Parents, in their criticism of the books, maintained that children
should be told what is "right" and "wrong" rather than probed about how they feel. They
viewed such probing as a form of sensitivity training, which they felt was less important for
the schools to concentrate on than imparting basic skills to the children. See id.
10 The textbook protesters obtained 12,000 signatures on a petition seeking the removal from
Kanawha County schools of all books which "[d]emean, encourage skepticism, or foster
disbelief in the institutions of the United States of America and in Western Civilization." A
Textbook Study, supra note 5, at 18. Among the institutions to which the petition referred
were:
The family unit [which] emerges from the marriage of man and woman;
Belief in a Supernatural Being, or a power beyond ourselves, or a power beyond our
comprehension;
The political system set forth in the Constitution of the United States of America
Id.
11 The boycotts, at their most effective stage, kept approximately a third of the Kanawha
County students out of school. United Press International, Charleston, W. Va., Nov. 18, 1974,
11:40. It is difficult to determine, however, whether the absent students were protesting the
use of the books or merely intimidated by threats of violence. Id., Nov. 15, 1974, 11:43.
" See A Textbook Study, supra note 5, at 23; note 7 supra.
'3 The board voted to return to the schools all of the disputed books. Two of the textbook
series, however, were placed on reserve in the library to be used only by students with parental
consent. A Textbook Study, supra note 5, at 23. The board also voted that no student be
required to use a book objectionable to the student or his parents on either moral or religious
grounds and that no teacher be allowed to indoctrinate a student with moral values or
religious beliefs objectionable to the student or his parents. Id.
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un-American and un-Christian textbooks.""4 Thereafter, the board, in an
attempt to quell the continued violence, adopted restrictive guidelines for
future textbook selections which, if applied stringently, would narrowly
limit the choice of textbooks. 5 The following year the guidelines were
apparently ignored, however, when the board of education unanimously
approved books recommended by the social science teachers' textbook
committee. Thus, Kanawha County may be viewed as a politically unsuc-
cessful attempt by parents to remove from the schools books they consid-
ered unsuitable for their children.16
The Kanawha County controversy is even more noteworthy because
it also involved an unsuccessful legal challenge to the specific issue of
textbook control. The parents of two school-aged children initiated that
challenge by bringing an action to enjoin the board from using the contro-
versial texts and educational materials in violation of their constitutionally
protected rights to religious freedom and privacy. 7 Today, the issues raised
by the Kanawha County controversy remain very much alive in view of
similar struggles over curriculum control in other school districts across the
country.'" This article will examine the rights of parents to control the
curriculum of the schools their children attend and the circumstances in
which parental objections to the curriculum may be sustained by the
courts.
PARENTS POSSESS LIMITED RIGHTS IN CONTROLLING THE EDUCATION OF THEIR
CHILDREN
That the state9 has a right to control the educational process of the
' Id. at 24. The action against the superintendent and the board members was ultimately
dismissed. Telephone interview with Hazel Kroesser, Coalition of Quality Education, Jan.
22, 1976.
11 The guidelines required that textbooks in use in Kanawha County: (1) recognize the signifi-
cance of the home in American society; (2) not question students about their inner feelings;
(3) not contain profanity; (4) not encourage racial hatred; (5) respect the rights of ethnic
groups; (6) encourage loyalty to the United States and not imply that any other political
system is superior; (7) reflect the true history of the United States; and, (8) stress the
importance of traditional rules of grammar. A Textbook Study, supra note 5, at 33-34.
" The entire course of events in Kanawha County, however, appears to have had a chilling
effect on many of the teachers, who have feared to be innovative or to use books which might
not be met with public approval. Telephone interview with Hazel Kroesser, Coalition of
Quality Education, Jan. 22, 1976.
" Williams v. Board of Educ., 388 F. Supp. 93 (S.D.W. Va. 1975), afl'd, Civil No. 75-1455
(4th Cir., Dec. 3, 1975).
" See N.Y. Times, July 25, 1975, at 47, col. 7.
" In order to accommodate the diverse communities within a state, the power to determine
curriculum is often delegated to local boards of education.
[Dieference to local control . . . is a recognition of the varying wants and needs of
the Nation's diverse and varied communities, each with its unique character, stan-
dards and sense of social importance of a variety of values.
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public schools is a well established principle of law"0 stemming from the
interest of the state in the welfare of its citizens." Nevertheless, the con-
flicting right of parents to direct their children's upbringing has, in certain
situations, been recognized. In this regard, Meyer v. Nebraska" and Pierce
v. Society of Sisters3 are illustrative.
The Meyer case involved an appeal by a teacher who was convicted
of violating a Nebraska statute which prohibited the teaching of any lan-
Mercer v. Michigan State Bd. of Educ., 379 F. Supp. 580, 585 (E.D. Mich.), aff'd, 419 U.S.
1081 (1974). For example, N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 2590-e (McKinney Supp. 1975) provides that
community boards shall have all the powers that are vested in the board of education for the
city district of the City of New York. See also State v. Haworth, 122 Ind. 462, 465, 23 N.E.
946, 947 (1890), where the court noted that "[i]t is for the law-making power to determine
whether the authority [over school affairs] shall be exercised by a state board of education,
or distributed to county, township, or city organizations throughout the state."
21 Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 107 (1968) (state has "undoubted right to prescribe the
curriculum for its public schools"); Mercer v. Michigan State Bd. of Educ., 379 F. Supp. 580,
586 (E.D. Mich.), aff'd, 419 U.S. 1081 (1974) (state has power to determine curriculum); State
v. Jackson, 71 N.H. 552, 554, 53 A. 1021, 1022 (1902) ("subject of education [is] one of public
concern, to be cherished, regulated, and controlled by the state").
This right of the state to control curriculum, however, is not unlimited. See, e.g., Epper-
son v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (state statute prohibiting the teaching of evolution
violates establishment clause of first amendment); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (compelling public school students to pledge allegiance to the
flag is violative of first amendment); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (state cannot
prohibit teaching of foreign languages to elementary school students), discussed in notes 24-
26 and accompanying text infra.
Also impinging upon the state's right to control education is the teacher's right to aca-
demic freedom, which may not be stifled by the state. Teachers retain their first amendment
rights in the classroom, giving them a certain degree of control over what is taught in the
public schools. See Parducci v. Rutland, 316 F. Supp. 352 (M.D. Ala. 1970); Mailloux v.
Kiley, 323 F. Supp. 1387, 1390 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 448 F.2d 1242 (1st Cir. 1971); Note, Academic
Freedom in the Public Schools: The Right to Teach, 48 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1176 (1973). That the
teacher's right to academic freedom may prevail over the rights of parents as well as over the
interests of the state is illustrated by Keefe v. Geanakos, 418 F.2d 359, 362 (1st Cir. 1969),
where the court, in considering the propriety of a teacher's use of a "dirty" word in the
classroom, noted that the students' parents' "sensibilities are not the full measure of what is
proper education." See generally 81 HARV. L. REV. 1045 (1968).
21 See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213, 221 (1972) (education necessary to enable
citizens to participate intelligently in the political system); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.
158, 166 (1944) (state may require education to protect youth's general interest); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923) (state has right to improve mental quality of its citizens);
Stephens v. Bongart, 15 N.J. Misc. 80, 82, 189 A. 131, 132 (Juv. & Dom. Rel. Ct. 1937) (police
power of state to provide for citizens' welfare extends to regulation of education); State v.
Bailey, 157 Ind. 324, 329-30, 61 N.E. 730, 732 (1901) ("The welfare of the child and the best
interests of society require that the state shall exert its sovereign authority to secure to the
child the opportunity to acquire an education."). See generally Note, Freedom and Public
Education: The Need for New Standards, 50 NOTRE DAME LAW. 530 (1975).
22 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
23 268 U.S. 510 (1925). Both the Meyer and Pierce opinions were authored by Justice McRey-
nolds.
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guage, except English, to a student who had not successfully completed the
eighth grade. 4 Invalidating the provision as violative of the teacher's right
to due process, the Court noted that the teacher's "right thus to teach and
the rights of parents to engage him so to instruct their children . . . are
within the liberty of the [fourteenth] Amendment." 5 In effect, the par-
ents' right to educate their children was recognized in connection with the
teacher's right to engage in a useful occupation. Thus, the Meyer Court
concluded that the statute was also an unconstitutional attempt to regu-
late a parent's right to control his child's education." It stopped far short,
however, of clarifying the precise dimensions of that right.
The parental rights alluded to in Meyer were reaffirmed in Pierce v.
Society of Sisters." The Pierce Court held unconstitutional a compulsory
education law mandating public education for every child between the
ages of 8 and 16. The law was found to constitute an unreasonable interfer-
ence with what had been treated in Meyer as a parent's right to direct his
child's education. 8 The Court asserted that, "[t]he child is not the mere
creature of the state; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have
the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for
additional obligations."2 Thus, the Meyer and Pierce decisions, considered
,1 262 U.S. at 397. Also prohibited was the teaching of any subject in a language other than
English. Id. The Nebraska Supreme Court had upheld the statute as a valid exercise of the
State's police power. The reasoning of the court was that it was "foreign to the best interests"
of America to allow the children of foreign-born residents to be taught the native language of
their parents before the American way of life had been inculcated upon them. Meyer v. State,
107 Neb. 657, 662, 187 N.W. 100, 102 (1922).
25 262 U.S. at 400. Since the fourteenth amendment had not yet been construed as imposing
upon the states the limitations of the first eight amendments, the Court had to rely on a very
broad concept of due process, i.e. the teacher's right to teach the proscribed subject was found
to be within the penumbras of due process. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 105-06
(1968). Today the teacher's right to academic freedom is based directly on the first amend-
ment right to free speech. See note 20 supra.
2' The Meyer Court expressly recognized that
the Legislature [had] attempted materially to interfere with the calling of modem
language teachers, with the opportunities of pupils to acquire knowledge, and with the
power of parents to control the education of their own.
262 U.S. at 401.
27 268 U.S. 510 (1925). Pierce involved a suit brought by Society of Sisters, an Oregon corpora-
tion engaged in the business of maintaining private schools and academies, for an order
restraining enforcement of the compulsory public education law. The Supreme Court, in
affirming the granting of the injunction by the district court, held that the unwarranted
compulsion of public school attendance would destroy the business and property of the
corporation. While, as the Court noted, it is generally true "that no person in any business
has such an interest in possible customers as to enable him to restrain exercise of proper power
of the State upon the ground that he will be deprived of patronage," id. at 535-36, it was found
that "the injuctions here sought [were] not against the exercise of any proper power." Id. at
536 (emphasis in original).
21 Id. at 534-35, citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
' 268 U.S. at 535.
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together, clearly indicate that parents have some basic rights in the gov-
erning of their children's education.
Although both of these cases have been cited repeatedly as champion-
ing a parent's right to direct his child's upbringing, 0 in each case, as the
respective Courts pointed out, the state's conflicting right to control the
schools was not at issue.' It appears, therefore, that neither of these cases,
notwithstanding their recognition of a parent's right to control his child's
education, can be construed to confer upon the parent any broad rights to
dictate curriculum materials.
It is well established that a parent cannot successfully avail himself
of the use of the courts simply on the basis of a disagreement he may have
with the curriculum as prescribed by the board of education or the state.
The Supreme Court has clearly pointed out that, "[ciourts do not and
cannot intervene in the resolution of conflicts which arise in the daily
operation of school systems and which do not directly and sharply impli-
cate basic constitutional values. 3 2 Where, however, a parent's constitu-
tional rights have been transgressed by the actions of the state or local
30 See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213-14 (1972) (state cannot compel Amish parents
to send their children to formal high school); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482
(1965) (marital privacy violated by statute prohibiting use of contraceptives); Prince v. Mas-
sachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (freedom of religion not violated by statute forbidding
parents to permit children to sell in the streets or work in violation of the law); Reed v. Van
Hoven, 237 F. Supp. 48, 51 (W.D. Mich. 1965) (prayer acceptable in public schools if organ-
ized pursuant to court-imposed regulations concerning time and place); People v. Stanley,
81 Colo. 276, 283, 255 P. 610, 613 (1927) (parents may absent children from reading of Bible
in public schools); In re John Children, 61 Misc. 2d 347, 363, 306 N.Y.S.2d 797, 813 (Family
Ct. Citywide Child Abuse Term 1969) (presumption that it is necessary to remove child from
parent addicted to narcotics not violative of fourteenth amendment).
3, The Meyer Court noted:
The power of the State to compel attendance at some school and to make reasonable
regulations for all schools . . . is not questioned [by either party]. Nor has challenge
been made of the State's power to prescribe a curriculum for institutions which it
supports.
262 U.S. at 402. Similarly, in Pierce, the Court observed:
No question is raised [by either party] concerning the power of the State reasonably
to regulate all schools, to inspect, supervise and examine them, their teachers and
pupils; to require . . . that certain studies plainly essential to good citizenship must
be taught, and that nothing be taught which is manifestly inimical to the public
welfare.
268 U.S. at 534.
32 Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968) (emphasis added) (statute prohibiting teach-
ing or use of textbook that teaches theory of evolution held unconstitutional). See also Shan-
ley v. Northeast Indep. School Dist., 462 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1972); Samuel Benedict Memorial
School v. Bradford, 111 Ga. 801, 36 S.E. 920 (1900). As has been pointed out by the Fifth
Circuit, in considering school regulations, "[ilt is not for [the court] to consider whether
- . . rules are wise or expedient but merely whether they are a reasonable exercise of the
power and discretion of the school authorities." Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir.
1966).
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board in establishing the curriculum, the courts must attempt to achieve
a proper balance between the state's rights and those of the parent.13 It
may be concluded, therefore, that parents will fail in their challenges if
their criticisms do not reach constitutional proportions or the constitu-
tional infringement is justified by a greater state interest.
PARENTAL COMPLAINTS NOT REACHING CONSTITUTIONAL PROPORTIONS
Often, a parent's challenge to school board policy is unsuccessful be-
cause the complaint is viewed merely as evidence of a distaste for the
school's curriculum. For example, in Rosenberg v. Board of Education34 a
parent sought to remove from the library shelves both Shakespeare's The
Merchant of Venice and Dickens' Oliver Twist for the sole reason that, in
the parent's view, they engendered antisemitism.35 The parent did not
contend that the books were approved by the board because of any antireli-
gious inclination," nor was any constitutional issue raised. In view of the
failure to establish either one of these factors, the court upheld the board's
exercise of its discretion in carrying out its legal duty to select books.37 That
the parent was offended by the two books was not deemed to be a sufficient
reason to suppress their use in the public schools. The court recognized:
If evaluation of any literary work is permitted to be based upon a requirement
that each book be free from derogatory reference to any religion, race, coun-
try, nation or personality, endless litigation respecting many books would
probably ensue, dependent upon sensibilities and views of the person suing.3"
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). As the Supreme Court has indicated,
a State's interest in universal education, however highly we rank it, is not totally free
from a balancing process when it impinges on fundamental rights and interests, such
as those specifically protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment,
and the traditional interest of parents with respect to the religious upbringing of their
children ....
Id. at 214; accord, Davis v. Page, 385 F. Supp. 395, 399 (D.N.H. 1974), discussed in notes
55-63 and accompanying text infra. See also State v. Hoyt, 84 N.H. 38, 41, 146 A. 170, 171
(1929), where the court recognized the conflicting rights of the parent and the state and
concluded that "the rule of reasonable conduct upon the part of each towards the other is to
be applied."
3,196 Misc. 542, 92 N.Y.S.2d 344 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1949).
3 Id. at 542-43, 92 N.Y.S.2d at 345.
36 It would have been difficult to contend that any antireligious sentiment was involved in
Rosenberg since the board of education there required the teachers to explain to the students
that the characters described in the two challenged materials were not typical of any nation
or race. Id. at 543, 92 N.Y.S.2d at 345.
37 Id. at 544, 92 N.Y.S.2d at 346.
"' Id. at 543, 92 N.Y.S.2d at 346. The Rosenberg court does, however, suggest two situations
in which the suppression of a book would be warranted: (1) where a book has been maliciously
written for the purpose of encouraging hatred of a particular group; and, (2) where the
administrators of the school have acted with malevolent intent in selecting a book. Id. at 543,
544, 92 N.Y.S.2d at 346. It is submitted that the first classification is misguided in that it
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The exercise of a school board's discretion was also sustained in
Presidents Council v. Community School Board No. 25.11 That case
involved a school board's decision to remove from the library the novel
Down These Mean Streets, thereby making it available only to parents on
a direct loan basis. The book, an account of life in Spanish Harlem, in-
cluded passages describing sexual and drug-related experiences. It was
apparently removed as a result of the claim of some parents that the
obscenities and sexual references contained therein would have an "ad-
verse moral and psychological effect" on the children. 0 Others,4 however,
felt that the book would have no such effect on their children and main-
tained that their first amendment rights had been violated by the book's
removal. The court held that no constitutional rights were transgressed
and that the wisdom of the board's decision was therefore not properly
reviewable12 It noted that while dissension is a predictable result of many
of the decisions made by the board in determining what books will be
stocked in the library,"43 "[tihe ensuing shouts of book burning, witch
hunting and violation of academic freedom hardly elevate this intramural
strife to first amendment constitutional proportions.""
The recent case arising out of the dispute in Kanawha County,
Williams v. Board of Education,45 even more poignantly illustrates the
burden a parent has in establishing that a state has violated the Constitu-
tion in exercising its power to regulate the curriculum of public schools.
The parents in Williams alleged that they were forced to send their chil-
dren to private school at added expense because the textbooks used in the
public schools undermined their religious beliefs46 and intruded upon their
ignores the possibility that a book may have educational value regardless of the author's
intent since the study of propaganda as such can easily be seen as a legitimate educational
concern. The necessity for judicial interference in the second situation is more apparent. Any
school official intending to promote hatred of a religion through the means of book selection
would doubtless appear to be in clear violation of the free exercise and establishment clauses
of the first amendment. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1968).
31 457 F.2d 289 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 998 (1972).
4o 457 F.2d at 291.
" The suit challenging the board's action was brought by former and current presidents of
various parent and parent-teacher associations, a librarian, several parents, three junior high
school students, two teachers, and a junior high school principal. Id. at 290.
41 Id. at 291.
13 The community board of education in Presidents Council was given the statutory power
to regulate the instruction of the students, including the right to select textbooks. See N.Y.
EDUC. LAW § 2590-e(3) (McKinney 1970).
" 457 F.2d at 292. With respect to the issue of a teacher's academic freedom, the court
observed that the board had not prohibited the use of the book in class by a teacher wishing
to discuss it, but had only denied the novel a place in the library. Id.
' 388 F. Supp. 93 (S.D.W. Va. 1975), aff'd, Civil No. 75-1455 (4th Cir., Dec. 3, 1975).
" 388 F. Supp. at 94. Some parents in Kanawha County have argued that the humanistic
approach to education evidenced in some of the textbooks violated the first amendment's
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right to familial privacy. 7 More specifically, the parents maintained that
the texts in question contained references to religion and morals which
were offensive to the establishment and free exercise clauses of the first
amendment and the right to privacy of the ninth and fourteenth amend-
ments." The court explicitly recognized that some of the materials were
"offensive to [the parents'] beliefs, choices of language, and code of con-
duct."49 It held, however, that the placing of books containing religious
references in the public schools in no way constitutes an establishment of
religion or an inhibition of the free exercise of religion.5 0 The court also
ruled that there had been no violation of the right to privacy. 5' Finding
establishment clause by promoting the teaching of Secular Humanism. See generally A
Textbook Study, supra note 5, at 49-51. Indeed, Secular Humanism has been recognized as
a religion. See Torasco v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 n.11 (1961); Welsh v. United States,
398 U.S. 333, 357 n.8 (1970) (concurring opinion). See also Washington Ethical Soc'y v.
District of Columbia, 249 F.2d 127, 129 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (dictum). It has been suggested,
however, that humanistic education does not amount to the teaching of the religion of Secular
Humanism and that there is no evidence that the challenged materials represent an attempt
to instill in the students the doctrine of Secular Humanism. A Textbook Study, supra note
5, at 75-76.
,7 388 F. Supp. at 94.
Id. at 95.
Id. at 96.
s' Id. In Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), the Supreme Court held
unconstitutional the daily reading of a prayer in the public schools. Nevertheless, the Court
maintained that the study of the Bible and religion as part of a secular education could be
implemented in accordance with the first amendment. Id. at 225. The test that Schempp
outlines is one of determining the purpose for which a religious reference or material is used.
If the purpose be to promote or inhibit a religious practice, there is a violation of the first
amendment. Id. at 222. In a concurring opinion Justice Brennan properly pointed out that
it would be impossible to teach meaningfully many subjects in the social sciences or
the humanities without some mention of religion. To what extent, and at what points
in the curriculum, religious materials should be cited are matters which the courts
ought to entrust very largely to the experienced officials who superintend our Nation's
public schools. They are experts in such matters, and we are not.
Id. at 300. See also McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring)
(our culture is so infused with religion that the educational system would be remiss if it
ignored these religious influences); Daniel v. Waters, 515 F.2d 485 (6th Cir. 1975) (study of
religion from literary and historical viewpoints is not violative of the first amendment).
The Williams case points out that even offensive references to religion may, in the right
context, be permissible under the first amendment. 388 F. Supp. at 96. Such a result would
appear to pass the purpose-oriented Schempp test, and is in accord with such cases as Todd
v. Rochester Community Schools, 41 Mich. App. 320, 200 N.W.2d 90 (1972), where, since the
court found that the antireligious views contained in Kurt Vonnegut's Slaughterhouse-Five
were neither taught subjectively nor part of any effort to demean Christianity, id. at 329-30,
200 N.W. 2d at 94, an attempt by parents to enjoin the book's use in the schools because of
its alleged violation of the establishment clause was unsuccessful.
SI 388 F. Supp. at 96. In dismissing the complaint, the court noted that although not explicitly
mentioned in the Constitution, the right to privacy has sometimes been recognized under the
ninth and fourteenth amendments. Id. Cases in which there has been such recognition include
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simply that the texts and materials were offensive, but the defendant's
actions not in violation of the Constitution, the court instructed the par-
ents that their relief lay in "administrative remedies through board of
education proceedings or ultimately at the polls on election day. '5
The introduction of sex-education courses in the public schools has
created a new subject for dispute. Many parents are of the opinion that
they should have the constitutional right to be the exclusive educators of
their children in so sensitive an area. Among other constitutional objec-
tions, such an argument was raised by a group of parents in Cornwell v.
State Board of Education.3 The plaintiffs in Cornwell challenged the en-
forcement of a bylaw passed by the board of education making sex educa-
tion for all children an integral part of the curriculum. In upholding the
bylaw, the court ruled that the constitutional allegations were wholly in-
substantial."
The aforementioned decisions suggest that the state's power to regu-
late the curriculum of the public schools is not easily challenged. Clearly,
attempts by parents to use the courts to redress their personal objections
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (ninth amendment supports assertion that
concept of liberty embraces marital privacy as a fundamental right), and Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (fourteenth amendment guarantees privileges essential to pursuit of
happiness). See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973), where the Supreme Court recog-
nized b 9 th Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), discussed in notes 27-29 and
accompanying text supra, and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), discussed in notes
24-26 and accompanying text supra, as granting a right to privacy in the rearing and educa-
tion of children.
12 388 F. Supp. at 96.
11 314 F. Supp. 340 (D. Md. 1969) (mem.), aff'd, 428 F.2d 471 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 942 (1970). The plaintiffs also alleged that making sex education an integral part of the
curriculum violated the first amendment and the equal protection and due process clauses
of the fourteenth amendment. 314 F. Supp. at 341.
11 314 F. Supp. 340 (D. Md. 1969) (mem.), aff'd, 428 F.2d 471 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 400
right to teach their children in matters pertaining to sex education, the court noted that it
knew of "no such constitutional right." Id. at 342. See also Medeiros v. Kiyosaki, 52 Hawaii
436, 478 P.2d 314 (1970) (course on sex education not violative of parents' constitutional rights
where parents have right to have their children excused); Hobolth v. Greenway, 52 Mich.
App. 682, 218 N.W.2d 98 (1974) (statute authorizing school districts to establish sex-
education programs and permitting parents to excuse children from such programs not an
unlawful delegation of legislative authority).
Not all parental challenges to sex-education classes, however, have proved so futile. In
Valent v. New Jersey State Bd. of Educ., 114 N.J. Super. 63, 274 A.2d 832 (1971), parents
alleged that their children were being compelled to attend sex-education classes which were
violative of their religious dogma. The court refused to grant summary judgment to the board
of education pointing out that there were questions of fact to be determined concerning
whether there were any possible alternatives to the present administration of the program
and whether the state's interest in compelling children to attend outweighed the constitu-
tional right to religious freedom. See generally Comment, Sex Education: The Constitutional
Limits of State Compulsion, 43 S. CAL. L. REv. 548 (1970).
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to curriculum content will be made in vain. This is true even where the
materials at issue are sincerely objectionable to a complaining parent.
CONSTITUTIONAL OBJECTIONS: APPLICATION OF A BALANCING TEST
In some instances part of a school curriculum may be found to be not
merely objectionable but actually violative of the parents' constitutional
rights. Even here, parents will be unsuccessful in their challenge if the
court determines that the state's interest in education is sufficient to over-
come such an infringement of the parents' rights.
Parental complaints based on alleged violations of religious freedom
are the most likely to reach constitutional proportions. In Davis v. Page55
the parents complained that the use of audiovisual equipment" conflicted
with the dogma of their Apostolic Lutheran faith. 7 Instead of attempting
to enjoin the use of audiovisual equipment in the schools, the parents
challenged only the school board's requirement that all children be physi-
cally present during the use of such equipment. The court recognized that
compelling the children to be exposed to the equipment did diminish the
parents' rights to direct the upbringing of their children. It took the
position, however, that since audiovisual equipment is such an integral
part of the educational process, to entitle the children to leave the room
385 F. Supp. 395 (D.N.H. 1974).
' "Audio-visual equipment," as defined by the court, means "any material designed to aid
in the children's learning and teaching by making use of both hearing and sight. This in-
cludes, but is not limited to, overhead projectors, film strips, television, radio, 8 mm movies,
and 16 mm movies." Id. at 399.
11 The parents also maintained that it was against their religious beliefs to use televisions or
radios; study humanist philosophy, evolution, or sexually related courses; partake in play
acting, singing, or dancing to worldly music; or discuss openly family and personal matters.
Id. at 397.
11 Id. at 399-400. The Davis court recognized that although the action was brought on behalf
of the children's rights, the parents were really asserting the freedom to shape their children's
religious beliefs in accordance with their own. Nevertheless, the case treated the rights of
parents and students as one, but the court admitted that the interests of each are not
necessarily the same. Id. at 398. It appears that the rights of a student to be exposed to courses
of study offensive to his parents have never been specifically granted. Justice Douglas, how-
ever, has pointed out that the courts should consider the views of the student before granting
the parents the right to keep their children out of school or have them excused from certain
activities. Dissenting in part in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), which allowed Amish
parents to keep their children out of school after the eighth grade, Justice Douglas noted:
If a parent keeps his child out of school beyond the grade school, then the child will
be forever barred from entry into the new and amazing world of diversity that we have
today. The child may decide that that is the preferred course, or he may rebel. It is
the student's judgment, not his parents', that is essential if we are to give full meaning
to what we have said about the Bill of Rights and of the rights of students to be masters
of their own destiny. If he is harnessed to the Amish way of life by those in authority
over him and if his education is truncated, his entire life may be stunted and deformed.
Id. at 245-46 (footnote omitted).
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each time the equipment is used would be to deny them an effective educa-
tion.59 Therefore, with respect to the use of audiovisual equipment, the
court held that the state's interest in providing education for its citizens
prevailed.
Where the equipment was used for entertainment purposes, however,
the Davis court found the balance to be in favor of the parents' rights to
have their children excused. In the opinion of the court, transgressing the
parents' rights to control the religious upbringing of their children was
simply not warranted by any state interest in providing entertainment in
the schools.6 0 The court was aware that the distinction between education
and entertainment at the elementary level may be almost imperceptible"1
and that to allow certain students to be excused from various activities can
lead to a stratification of the school structure. 2 Nevertheless, it held that
the students would be allowed to leave the classroom when the audiovisual
equipment was used for entertainment purposes.63
The state's interest in education, as asserted in Davis, grows partly out
of the fact that the children involved must be prepared to face life in the
mainstream of American society. The state has a recognized interest in
providing each student with the essentials of good citizenship." As the
Davis court noted, the children will "one day seek employment in the
public sector and they will find that a basic education is essential when
seeking gainful employment."6 5
11 385 F. Supp. at 401.
sO Id.
1 Id.
6 Id. at 405-06. Students remaining in the classroom during audiovisual activities were called
"sinners" by those leaving the classroom. Id. at 406.
" Id. at 401. The Davis court's separation of the educational and entertainment aspects of
the school curriculum seems to be disadvantageous to the students. The court's refusal to
allow students to be excused when audiovisual equipment is used for educational purposes
was obviously a recognition of the state's strong power where the child's welfare is concerned.
See Parr v. State, 117 Ohio St. 23, 26, 157 N.E. 555, 556 (1927). Yet in allowing students to
be dismissed when the equipment is used to entertain the children, the court failed to perceive
the disruptive effect of such an excusal system upon the students' integration into the social
scheme of the school. See State v. Counort, 69 Wash. 361, 124 P. 910 (1912). Contra, State v.
Ferguson, 95 Neb. 63, 144 N.W. 1039 (1914). It is submitted that this greatly diminishes the
impact of the first part of the court's holding.
1, 385 F. Supp. at 400. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); People v. Stanley,
81 Colo. 276, 255 P. 610 (1927); State v. Hoyt, 84 N.H. 38, 146 A. 170 (1929); Parr v. State,
117 Ohio St. 23, 157 N.E. 555 (1927). See also Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954),
where the Court noted:
[Education] is required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities,
even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today
it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him
for later professional training, and in helping him adjust normally to his environment.
Id. at 493.
65 385 F. Supp. at 400.
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This strong state interest in compulsory education, however, was chal-
lenged by Amish parents who claimed that their children would be enter-
ing an isolated existence. In Wisconsin v. Yoder 6 the Supreme Court sus-
tained the parents' right to remove their children from school after the
eighth grade 7 despite the state's compulsory education law mandating
that children attend school until the age of 16. It deemed the exposure of
an Amish child to the competition and conformity of a public school class-
room a barrier to the child's integration into the religious community of
the Amish,"5 a community inseparable from the Amish daily lifestyle. 9 It
was significant to the Court that the Amish had thrived as an independent
community without becoming a burden to the state. 7 Thus, transgressing
the parents' constitutional right to religious freedom via compulsory edu-
cation could not, in the opinion of the Court, be justified by any compelling
state interest."
While Yoder does represent an extension of parental rights, the Court
expressly pointed out that its holding should not be interpreted to alter the
"fact that courts are not school boards or legislatures, and are ill-equipped
to determine the necessity of discrete aspects of a State's program of com-
pulsory education."" Rather, the parental rights granted in Yoder, stem
only from the extraordinary showing which the Court required to outweigh
the state's power to demand a compulsory education. It is submitted that
the Yoder standard, if applied to a parent who seeks to enjoin the use of a
book because it is allegedly violative of some constitutional right, will
rarely, if ever, be met. This is due to the difficulty that a parent will have
in establishing that the use of so-called morally offensive literature either
establishes a religion or inhibits the free exercise of religion.73 As the Yoder
Court points out, "subjective evaluation and rejection of the contemporary
secular values accepted by the majority" will not "rise to the demands of
the Religion Clauses." 7'
08 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
0 Id. at 234. Amish parents viewed the first eight years of education as necessary to impart
to their children the basics of reading the Bible, managing productive farms, and interacting,
when necessary, with non-Amish people. Id. at 212.
'8 Id. at 211.
, Id. at 216.
70 Id. at 225.
" For an excellent discussion of the Yoder case, interpreting it as eroding the state's power
to compel education, see Kurland, The Supreme Court, Compulsory Education, and the First
Amendment's Religion Clauses, 75 W. VA. L. REv. 213 (1973).
7 406 U.S. at 235.
, See Williams v. Board of Educ., 388 F. Supp. 93 (S.D.W. Va. 1975), aff'd, Civil No. 75-
1455 (4th Cir., Dec. 3, 1975).
" 406 U.S. at 216. It is further submitted that courts may be hesitant to enforce parents'
demands to remove books or allow students to be exempted from certain classes because, in
applying the balancing test, such a judicial act itself may be considered as violative of the
establishment clause. The Yoder Court addressed this concern and warned that "an exception
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CONCLUSION
The cases where parents have been most successful in showing that
their constitutional rights have been violated by a part of the curriculum
are generally cases involving the first amendment's establishment and free
exercise clauses.75 Even where these constitutional rights have been vio-
lated, parents have still been denied the right to control the education of
their children where a court finds that the state's interest in directing
education is superior.
The school boards' right to adopt courses and select textbooks is one
that is not second guessed by the courts, even at the urging of a parent who
is sincerely offended by the material to which his child is exposed at school.
This result is mandated by the need for public schools which run efficiently
and without parental interference with every act of discretion made by the
school boards. Unless they resort to private schools or more effectively
influence the public school boards on election day, the dissatisfied parents
of Kanawha County and others similarly situated will find that the right
to control the education of their child stops at the schoolhouse gate.
from a general obligation of citizenship on religious grounds may run afoul of the Establish-
ment Clause ... ." Id. at 220-21. This potential danger may even be a factor in a court's
initial determination that there exists no valid religious objection necessitating the applica-
tion of a balancing test. See Williams v. Board of Educ., 388 F. Supp. 93 (S.D.W. Va. 1975).
" See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968);
Daniel v. Waters, 515 F.2d 485 (6th Cir. 1975); Davis v. Page, 385 F. Supp. 395 (D.N.H. 1974).
